Ukrainian construction workers
VoxEU Column Labour Markets Migration

Ukrainian refugee labour market access shows no impact on local employment outcomes in Czechia

Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine sparked Europe’s largest refugee crisis since WWII. Unlike past waves of migrants, Ukrainian refugees gained immediate labour market access through the EU’s Temporary Protection Directive, offering a unique policy test. This column finds that the resulting labour force increase had no economically meaningful impact on employment, unemployment, or inactivity rates among the local population in Czechia – the largest Ukrainian-refugee host on a per-capita basis – regardless of gender, education, or industry.

A recent global survey revealed that three-quarters of adults believe those fleeing war or persecution should be able to seek safety in other countries (Tu 2024). However, refugee policies have sparked vivid discussions in every recent election in Europe, divided societies, and even brought down governments – as was the case in the Netherlands in 2023. Despite rich academic evidence showing no detrimental effects on wages or employment among local workers (Clemens and Hunt 2017), public opinion in the EU has grown increasingly polarised over refugee policies, financial support, and labour market access. 1

An unexpected policy shift: Immediate labour market integration

Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, over a quarter of the Ukrainian population became displaced; by December 2022, the UN’s High Commissioner for Refugees reported that nearly eight million individuals had sought refuge across Europe. For the first time in history, the EU invoked the Temporary Protection Directive, granting Ukrainian refugees immediate access to employment, retraining programmes, self-employment, healthcare, education, and living allowances.

This response contrasts sharply with the usual lengthy procedures in the EU – where refugees often wait months or even years to gain such rights – allowing us to gain insight into the effects of such policies. 2 In our recent research (Postepska and Voloshyna 2025), we look at Czechia, which emerged as a key destination for displaced Ukrainians. By December 2022, this mid-sized nation had granted Temporary Protection to approximately 433,000 Ukrainians, becoming the world’s leading host of Ukrainian refugees per capita. Figure 1 illustrates the magnitude of this demographic shock, a population increase of about 4%.

Figure 1

Figure 1

Note: This figure details the count of Ukrainian immigrants residing in Czechia, distinguishing between the total population and those of working age (18-65 years). The noticeable uptick corresponds to the arrival of refugees. The plot was created by the authors from data reported by the Ministry of the Interior (2023a,b) of Czechia.

Finding paths and opportunities: Refugee destinations, employment, and the role of networks

Given the immediate access to the labour market, many Ukrainians quickly integrated into the Czech workforce: nearly one-third of all registered Ukrainian refugees of working age (18–65) had secured formal employment by the end of 2022. This rapid integration is not surprising, as most refugees were well-educated and of working age (see Tables 1 and 2). Initially, language barriers and the transferability of skills posed significant challenges, with early studies indicating that 60–87% lacked English proficiency and 69–91% had no knowledge of Czech (Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs 2022, UNHCR 2022). However, follow-up studies showed improvements in Czech language skills among adults, suggesting a gradual easing of these obstacles (Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs 2023). Furthermore, humanitarian aid provided only temporary financial support for the first 150 days upon arrival – insufficient aid for long-term needs – making employment a necessity. 3

Table 1

table 1

Note: This table compares the age and gender distribution between Ukrainian refugees in Czechia as of 31 December 2022 and the Czech native population based on the 2021 Census. The table was created by the authors using data sourced from the Ministry of the Interior (2023b) and the 2021 Census (Czech Statistical Office, 2024b). Age categories have been harmonised to ensure comparability. Capital City Prague and Brno-City were selected as economically stronger districts, while Tachov and Cheb were chosen to represent more peripheral regions, with both selected randomly to highlight th heterogeneity of indicators across different areas.

Table 2

Table 2

Notes: The table was created by the authors using 2021 Census data for Czechs (Czech Statistical Office, 2021) and Ukrainian refugee education data from surveys conducted by (a) the Czech Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (2022), (b) IOM (2023a), and (c) UNHCR (2022). The latter two surveys, being non-representative, provide only indicative insights. Educational categories were harmonised for comparability.

Free to move within the country, refugees displayed clear patterns of self-selection in their settlement and employment choices, gravitating toward economically prosperous areas with higher GDP, employment, wages, and education levels. Established Ukrainian diasporas also played a visible role in attracting newcomers – as evidenced by the high correlation coefficients (0.99 and 0.81) between the locations of Ukrainians residing and working in 2021 and those of refugees in 2022 – and further supported by a 2022 UNHCR survey, where the largest group of refugees (23%) reported choosing Czechia primarily because they had family or friends who were already there (UNHCR 2022).

A zero-sum game? Exploring the short-term impact of Ukrainian refugees on labour market outcomes for local Czech workers

In light of this evidence, it is undisputable that the Czech labour market (like other European countries) experienced a rapid and largely unexpected increase in labour supply. Using data from the Labour Force Survey, we ask: what were the short-term consequences of this rapid influx of refugees into the workforce on the labour market outcomes of locals? 

Our strategy focuses on comparing districts within Czechia. Since Ukrainian refugees settled unevenly across the country – with some districts receiving more refugees than others (see Figure 2) – we leverage this variation to isolate the effects of refugees on labour market outcomes of local populations.

Figure 2

Figure 2

Note: The increases in Ukrainian nationals’ employment by district as of December 2022. The plot was created by the authors using the data reported by the Ministry of the Interior (2023b)) and the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (2023a)) of Czechia.

We find consistent evidence that the influx of Ukrainian refugees had no economically meaningful impact on employment, unemployment, or inactivity rates among Czech locals in the short run – regardless of gender, education level, or industry.

We also find consistent evidence of an increase in weekly working hours among local women. Specifically, a 1% increase in officially employed Ukrainians relative to the size of a district’s labour market leads to an increase of up to 0.62% in weekly hours worked by Czech women – approximately 14.4 minutes per week – primarily among those with secondary education employed in the most affected sectors.

Policy implications of the Czech case study: Navigating context for effective solutions

Though we find no evidence that the influx of Ukrainian refugees crowded out local workers, how generalisable are these results? There is suggestive evidence that the context of the Czech labour market contributed to the null effects identified. At the time of the refugees’ arrival, the Czech labour market was exceptionally tight: it had the lowest unemployment rate in the EU (Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs 2021) and the majority of vacancies (73%) required only basic education. Employment opportunities were abundant in sectors such as retail trade, construction, public administration, and education, which were already facing labour shortages (EURES 2023). These sectors became the main employers for Ukrainian refugees, who often took on low-skilled roles such as product and equipment assemblers; construction, production, and transport aides; or stationary machine operators, thereby helping to alleviate the workforce gap.

The combination of a tight labour market and existing shortages in key industries likely mitigated potential disruptions from the influx of refugees, at least in the short term. This context raises important considerations for policy design. The neutral outcomes in Czechia could support arguments for policies that facilitate refugees or immigrants in filling existing labour shortages, perhaps through targeted matching of their skills with market needs.

Investment in the future

Understanding the impact of Ukrainian refugees on local labour markets is not just a matter of academic interest; it has direct implications for current and future policies on refugee and migrant integration. Moreover, as Rapoport (2023) argues, temporary protection combined with facilitated access to the local labour market enables refugees to acquire skills crucial for post-conflict reconstruction in their home countries (Bahar et al. 2019, Rapoport 2023). Given the strong intention among Ukrainian refugees to eventually return home (Adema et al. 2024) and the documented shift in preferences toward investment in human rather than physical capital among refugees (Becker et al. 2020, Becker 2022), the human capital accumulated while in host countries holds significant potential for Ukraine’s recovery after the war – an argument that should not be overlooked in policy debates.

Editors’ note: This column is published in collaboration with the International Economic Associations’ Women in Leadership in Economics initiative, which aims to enhance the role of women in economics through research, building partnerships, and amplifying voices.

References

Adema, J A, C G Aksoy, Y Giesing, and P Poutvaara (2024), “Understanding return intentions and integration of Ukrainian refugees”, VoxEU.org, 4 May.

Bahar, D, A Hauptmann, C Özgüzel and H Rapoport (2019), “Migration and post-conflict reconstruction: The effect of returning refugees on export performance in the former Yugoslavia”, VoxEU.org, 22 November.

Becker, S O (2022), “Lessons from history for our response to Ukrainian refugees”, VoxEU.org, 29 March.

Becker, S O, I Grosfeld, P Grosjean, N Voigtländer and E Zhuravskaya (2020), “A silver lining of forced migration: Investment in education”, VoxEU.org, 28 January.

Clemens, M and J Hunt (2017), “Research on the wage and employment impact of refugees shows modest or no harmful effects on native workers”, VoxEU.org, 21 July.

Czech Statistical Office (2021, 2022), "Results of Census".

Czech Statistical Office (2024a), "Public Database".

Czech Statistical Office (2024b), "Public Database: Population".

DGP (2023), "Poles Less Willing to Help Ukraine", Dziennik Gazeta Prawna.

ECRE (2023), Access to the Labour Market: Germany.

ECRE (2024), Mapping Asylum Procedures, Reception Conditions, Detention and Content of Protection in Europe.

EURES (2023), Labour Market Information: Czechia, July.

European Commission (2023a), EU Challenges and Priorities in 2023, September.

European Commission (2023b), Standard Eurobarometer 99, July.

Forsal (2023), "Our Attitude towards Helping Ukrainians is Changing:, October.

Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (2021), Structure of applicants and vacancies.

Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (2022), "The Situation of a Refugee from Ukraine".

Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (2023), "Employment of Foreign Nationals".

Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, PAQ Research, and ISAS (2023), “Voice of Ukrainians: Work, Housing, Poverty and Knowledge of the Czech Language”, technical report, February.

Ministry of the Interior (2023), "Statistics Related to the War in Ukraine".

Postepska, A and A Voloshyna (2025), “The effect of Ukrainian refugees on the local labour markets: The case of Czechia”, Journal of Population Economics 38(1): 30.

Rapoport, H (2023), “Labour market access for Ukrainian refugees”, VoxEU.org, 9 January.

UNHCR (2022), Lives on Hold: Intentions and Perspectives of Refugees from Ukraine.

Úřad práce ČR (2023), "Approximate Calculation of Humanitarian Aid".

Footnotes

  1. In Poland, surveys show increasing opposition to aiding Ukrainians, with 36% opposed and 26% in support (Forsal 2023). Another survey indicates a divided stance, with 49.1% in favour of aid but 39.4% viewing Ukrainians negatively; some cite perceptions of refugees having a ‘demanding attitude’, and 14.5% believe Ukrainians have more rights than Poles (GDP 2023). EU-wide, Eurobarometer reveals a slight decline in support for Ukraine: 86% (down from 88%) back humanitarian aid, and 77% (down from 86%) support accepting war refugees (European Commission 2023a, b).
  2. In the EU, the duration for refugees to obtain the right to work has varied (ECRE 2024); since March 2020, for example, Germany’s general rule has been that asylum seekers in reception centres are not allowed to take up employment, with most adults facing a wait of 18 months, and in some Federal States a wait of up to 24 months (ECRE 2023).
  3. Assistance could be up to 6,000 CZK (€245) for vulnerable individuals and 3,000 CZK (€122) for others (Úřad práce ČR 2023)